What I want to do here is to look more closely at the other side of the coin and to argue that, much as the 'old' SAP did at Sharpeville in 1960 -and on so many other occasions more or less from the day it was established on 1 April 1913 -the 'new' SAPS resorts all too readily to the use of excessive, and often lethal, force in the face of what the police, their leaders and members of local and national elites see as insurrectionary action. By 'insurrection' I mean, as the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary has it, 'the action ... of rising against authority or government'. In the case of Sharpeville, the insurrectionary nature of the protests lay in the centrality of the pass laws to the regime's ability to control subaltern populations. Large-scale protests against these laws organised by Africanist militants in a hitherto stable and well-ordered township in the industrial heartlands of the Vaal Triangle posed a threat to the whole edifice of apartheid. They could not be allowed to continue unchecked. In Marikana, the action of the strikers represented a multi-faceted challenge to the foundations of the post-apartheid economic and political dispensation: to the ability of the mine's owners, Lonmin, to operate the mine at a profit; to South Africa's ability to attract foreign investment; to the dominance in the mining industry of the National Union of Mineworkers, an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (itself a partner of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in a tri-partite alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP)); and finally to the political hegemony of the ANC at a time when it was struggling to control a revolt by the former president of its Youth League, Julius Malema. 3 If we are to understand why the SAPS acted against the striking miners at Marikana in the way that it did, I will argue that the events of 16 th August 2012 have to be seen in the context of South Africa's attempts to deal with the violence of apartheid exemplified by the killings at Sharpeville over half a century earlier. In doing so, I will focus on two related forms of violence. I will look first at the structural violence of apartheid and the system of migrant labour on which the colonial and apartheid mining economies were based. Secondly, and more specifically, I will consider the use of personal violence by the police in managing the effects of injustice and inequality, and responding to popular protests against them.
The structural violence of apartheid
Reflecting on the persistence and pervasiveness of social violence during the period of South Africa's transition to democracy from 1990, Brandon Hamber (1998) draws attention to the social and structural factors that underpin it. The victims of apartheid, he argues, suffered arbitrary arrests, beatings, assassinations and torture. But this was not all, for they were also 'subjected to the structural and systematic violence of poverty, malnutrition, inferior education, urban overcrowding and social strife' (Hamber 1998: unpaginated) . Although he describes this underlying condition as involving 'structural violence' he makes no reference to the origins of the term. These lie in the Page | 4 work of the American peace researcher, Johan Galtung (1969: 171) , who distinguishes between the direct, personal violence inflicted, for example, when the police arrest, beat, torture or kill and the indirect structural violence that 'shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances'. Galtung (1969: 171, emphasis in original) summarises the main features of structural violence thus:
Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on. Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed.
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These two sentences provide an admirable summary of the economic, social and political structure of apartheid South Africa.
But to return to Hamber (1998: unpaginated) , the main point of his argument is that the notion of reconciliation central to South Africa's transition to democracy would not deliver on the promise of peace if the 'deep-rooted inequities and social imbalances' of apartheid remained unaddressed. The main institutional mechanism for coming to terms with the legacy of apartheid, and for bringing about reconciliation in a democratic South Africa, was the TRC. Yet, as many authors not unsympathetic to the TRC and attentive to the limitations imposed on it by its legislative mandate and the nature of the country's negotiated transition to democracy, have noted, the Commission failed to grapple in any systematic way with the apartheid system in all its complexity leaving it to form a blurred and under-analysed background to the gross violations of human rights that were the main focus of the TRC's work (see, for example, Posel 2002; Simpson 2002; Gready 2011) .
Institutional hearings (including one on the business sector) were held in an effort to bring the workings of apartheid into sharper focus, but Deborah Posel (2002: 163) concludes that the TRC's final report offers little in the way of serious historical analysis and sheds no fresh light on its social, ideological and institutional features. Even where the TRC's mandate did extend to attempting to right the wrongs of apartheid in a material way, it was able to do no more than recommend a programme of reparations for the individual victims of gross human rights violations and it was not until late 2003 that the then government began to make final lump sum payments of R30, 000 (or approximately $4, 000) -an amount that was considerably lower than the Commission had initially suggested (Gready 2011) . In the final analysis, then, it went some way beyond both the mandate and the capacity of the TRC to tackle the rampant injustices and inequities bequeathed to the new democracy by apartheid and the primary responsibility for translating the rhetoric of reconciliation into reality, and tackling the structural violence of apartheid, has rested with the governments elected since 1994. It is to the social and economic policies of those governments that we must turn
Page | 5 if we are to understand what has gone wrong, and why, twenty years on, resources continue to be so unevenly distributed, and the power to decide on their distribution so concentrated in the hands of a new, partially reconstituted elite.
Post-apartheid political economy
Prompted perhaps by the twentieth anniversary of the 1994 elections, the political economy of postapartheid South Africa has received a good deal of critical attention in recent year years (Marais 2011; Terreblanche 2012; Habib 2013; Hart 2013; Bundy 2014; Saul and Bond 2014) . Despite some inevitable differences in emphasis among authors from a range of disciplinary backgrounds and ideological positions, this body of work offers an account of the efforts made by successive governments to bind up the socio-economic wounds of apartheid that is broadly consistent and provides an important insight into why patterns of structural violence evident at Sharpeville in 1960
are not hard to detect in contemporary Marikana. What follows here is an attempt to provide a rough chronology of developments over the last 20 years and to place the Marikana shootings in the wider context of a post-apartheid political economy in which the minerals-energy complex (MEC) continues to play an influential if not dominant role.
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The story begins in the late 1980s when, according to Sampie Terreblanche (2012) , representatives of the MEC set about the task of orchestrating the transformation of South Africa's politicoeconomic system. Baldly stated, their objective was to ensure that, whatever political settlement was reached between the ANC and the outgoing National Party government, the economy would continue to be dominated by 'capitalist/corporatist' interests (Terreblanche 2012: 68) . While public negotiations over a new constitutional dispensation took place through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in the years leading up to 1994, a parallel set of secret discussions were being held during the course of which the leaders of national and global capital sought to 'box in' the ANC so that 'it would not be possible for an ANC government to pursue socialist, populist or redistributive policies' (Terreblanche 2012: 68) . In return, opportunities were offered to the 'emerging ANC elite' to buy into the commanding heights of the economy by means of black economic empowerment and affirmative action and procurement, and to begin to enjoy the affluent lifestyles of their white counterparts (Terreblanche 2012: 69) .
Although others are more sympathetic to the ANC in their accounts of this critical period in the evolution of the post-apartheid politico-economic system, there is a broad measure of agreement among recent commentators that, by the time the ANC-led Government of National Unity took office 1994, the leadership of the main liberation movement had been seduced and/or coerced into accepting the terms offered by capital, with domestic and international representatives of the MEC (Bundy, 2014: 37).
In six short years the ANC's economic policy set off from a socialist platform, chugged briefly along a social democratic branch line, but ultimately steamed into Neo-liberal Central. The evidence is unequivocal. Wealth in South Africa has been partly deracialised. Poverty remains strongly racialised, visited with particular severity upon Africans, at the bottom of the economic pecking order now as they were under apartheid.
In sum then, and recast in terms of Galtung's definition of structural violence quoted earlier, successive post-apartheid governments have been unable, and perhaps insufficiently willing, to use their political power to bring about a radical redistribution in income, wealth and other resources.
Mining and the minerals-energy complex
Nowhere are the limits of post-apartheid transformation more evident than in the mining industry.
Sitting at the heart of the minerals-energy complex, violence has been a defining characteristic of the industry, and of the migrant labour system on which it has depended since first diamonds then gold were discovered in South Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century. Dunbar Moodie (1994) records how assaults on black workers were endemic on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand until the 1970s. When they were underground, migrant workers from Lesotho, Mozambique and what is now South Africa's Eastern Cape province, were subjected to direct, personal violence at the hands of white supervisors and black 'bossboys' straining to meet the production targets on which their bonuses, and the profits of the mining houses, depended. The brutality migrants experienced at work was mirrored by the structural violence built into the single sex compounds in which they lived far from their families in the rural areas (Moodie 1994: 180) . Although they were designedoften on explicitly panoptical lines -and run in the interests of maintaining order among the workforce (Moodie 1994: 77) , the compounds were themselves the sites for further violence in the form of 'faction fights'. While they may have been prompted by concerns over job security and simmering resentments against the tyranny of the 'bossboys', Kynoch (1998: 640 The truth is that we live like pigs while the mine smiles when we dig that platinum and make them rich. We have nothing to show for our long hours of work. We have to provide for ourselves here as well as our families back home. (Jika 2013: 86-7) As is the case with other informal settlements across the platinum belt to the north and west of Johannesburg -38 of them in the Rustenburg municipality around Marikana alone -Nkaneng is 'a post-apartheid phenomenon' and reflects the changes that have occurred in the migrant labour system, and the labour practices of mining houses like Lonmin in an era of neo-liberal globalisation (Chinguno 2013: 12) . Among these changes is the increasing use of often non-unionised labour employed through a network of brokers and sub-contractors leading two observers to estimate that up to a third of the workforce in the platinum sector may be indirectly employed through third parties (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, cited in Chinguno 2013: 13).
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Attempts to end the system of living in ethnically-segregated single sex compound hostels by providing more family-friendly accommodation for the migrant workers who still make up the vast majority of Lonmin's workforce have only succeeded in creating or exacerbating the problems of 'living out' observed by . According to the company's own figures for 2010, 83% of its 28,000 full-time employees were South Africans, but only 18% came from the local area around the mine defined as the 'Greater Lonmin community' (Chinguno 2013: 8) . Unfortunately for the thousands of migrant workers drawn to Marikana and other, similar mines for work, the consequences of offering subsidies and allowances to encourage them to move out of single men's hostels has been to burden them with all the costs of acquiring and maintaining a second homeand sometimes a second family too -in a shack settlement near their place of employment (Chinguno 2013; Hartford 2013) . Hartford (2013: 160) is damning in his criticism of a 'pattern of migrant labour super-exploitation ... that has remained unaltered in the 18 years of democracy'.
Nothing, he argues, has been done either to shorten the migration cycle to enable workers to maintain connections with their families in the rural areas or to increase the remittances on which whole communities in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere rely.
Sadly, the mining industry has remained a prisoner of its apartheid past in this core element of cheap labour sourced through a migrant's punishing annual work cycle and all the social evils associated with [it] . (Hartford 2013: 161) It is only in the wider context of structural violence built into the migrant labour system in its contemporary form that the actions of the strikers, and the direct violence visited on them by the police, can be fully understood. If the protesters at Sharpeville posed a threat to apartheid's ability to control the movements of an urban African workforce and regulate the number of people coming to join it from the countryside, the strikers at Marikana, and their claims for what they saw as a living wage, represented a challenge to a brutalising system of migrant labour on which Lonmin, other platinum producers and the mining industry more generally continues to depend for its profits. Steinberg (2014) and Marks and Bruce (2014) ).
The dark history of apartheid policing documented by Brogden and Shearing (1993) and Brewer (1994) among others forms the background to the first of these periods and, as will become evident later, has its echoes in the police response to a rising tide of popular protests in the second.
Investigating this history was part of the mandate of the TRC and fully 87% of the applications for amnesty received by the Commission from the side of the former government and its security forces were submitted by members of the SAP (Foster et al 2005: 15) . However, and notwithstanding the fact that many of the deaths reported by victims of human rights violations and their families in testimony to the Commission arose from public order policing, the vast majority of police applicants came from the Security Branch (ibid). Only two were received in relation to 'riot control' situations.
The Commission's discussion of public order policing in its final report may be brief, amounting to no more than 13 pages, but its findings are unambiguous: the SAP, specifically its Riot and Internal Stability Units, 'displayed a gross disregard for the lives and/or physical well-being of ... those 'dual system of policing'. This involved the police and civil society, public order units and demonstrators, in the co-production of security and peaceful protests (Brogden and Shearing 1993: 182-6 important of all, more positive in its approach to crowds and much less likely to resort to the indiscriminate use of brute force against protestors (ibid). Marks (2005: 244) attributes this transformation to the changes in the structural conditions of policing brought about since the end of apartheid including the adoption of a new Constitution and supporting legislation committing the renamed SAPS to a community-based approach to policing as a public service to be delivered in accordance with new principles of governance and respect for human rights. 9 But she also found that the process was by no means untrammelled: some sub-groups within the unit remained resistant to change and opposed to affirmative action as a vehicle for transformation while others clung to unreconstructed attitudes towards both crowds and African township residents (Marks 2005: 245) . There was general adherence to the principle of the use of minimum force but there were also times, particularly during crime prevention operations, when beatings were administered and property wrecked in ways reminiscent of the apartheid years -a time which many members recalled with great fondness (Marks, 2005: 245-6 ).
With the ANC feeling increasingly secure in its hold on political power and confident in the loyalty of the police to a government whose members it had only recently seen as mortal enemies (Dixon 2004) , considerable progress was made over the first five years of democracy in turning the SAPS into the rights-respecting, community-oriented, victim-aware organisation contemplated in the Preamble to the South African Police Service Act (No. 68 of 1995). That ordinary black South
Africans were able to demand the assistance of the police at times when, in Egon Bittner's (1990: 294) famous words, 'something-is-happening-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-whichsomeone-had-better-do-something-now' amounted to a fundamental shift in the relationship between police and citizen (Steinberg 2014) . That those same citizens could reasonably expect not to be shot at if they chose to exercise their constitutionally-guaranteed right 'peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions', 10 and to be treated with a measure of respect when their homes were searched was no less remarkable, even if, as Marks'
Page | 12 research indicates, the SAPS were not always able to meet the exacting standards of democratic, constitutional policing in practice.
Elite conflicts, crime-fighting and the use of maximum force (2000 -2012)
Although considerable progress was made in these early years, crime rates, and those for the most disturbing types of 'contact crime' in particular, continued to rise throughout the late 1990s and in to the early 2000s peaking -if official SAPS figures are to be believed -in 2003 (Presidency 2014) .
Violent crime, and the state's apparent inability to control it, became the subject of often furious political controversy. Politicians from the ruling party were not slow to reflect the mounting frustration among sections of the public, and within the SAPS itself, with a culture of human rights the extent to which the unity and discipline of the ANC was being eroded even at the highest levels.
The effect of these elite and sub-elite conflicts on policing, the rest of the criminal justice system and the very nature of South African democracy, have been subjected to critical scrutiny in recent work by Karl von Holdt (2013) and Jonny Steinberg (2014) . Von Holdt (2013: 595) argues that, in the 'fierce competition for access to lucrative contracts', control of the instruments of state coercionand of the investigatory powers of the police -become crucial:
Contestation takes place in and around formal codes and laws, and in the process the law is One of the most striking features of these protests is the role played by the police. A recent study
shows that, in six of the seven municipalities for which data was examined, organisers were more likely to give issues relating to crime and the justice system as a reason for holding a protest than corruption, labour relations or service delivery more generally (Grant, 2014) . Von Holdt's (2011: 30) overview of the case studies presented in an evocatively titled report on 'insurgent citizenship', The
Smoke that Calls, contains a catalogue of police abuses. These include the random use of tear gas and rubber bullets against crowds of protestors and bystanders, beatings and assaults administered There is no need to rehearse the details of Bruce's account here, but three things are worth noting in making the connection between the events at Marikana on 16 th August 2012 and the deaths of community protesters, the organisational realignment of public order policing with crime combating and the evolution of a policy that appeared to endorse the use of maximum (up to and including lethal) force in responding to the violent criminals involved in cash-in-transit robberies. 12 The first is that, as Bruce (2012: chap. 5) points out, it is hard to reconcile the notion of maximum force with s. feature of the migrant labour system on which the mining industry, including platinum producers like Lonmin, continues to depend. I have also suggested that the incomplete reform of policing in the 1990s, the partial reversal of some of the changes that were made during this period in the face of persistently high crime rates, the gradual unravelling of the political hegemony of the ANC and its allies, and the conflation of public order policing with combating crime (and violent acquisitive crime in particular) have contributed to a climate in which the use of direct, sometimes fatal, violence by the police has become accepted even, in extremis, expected under a legally dubious doctrine on the use of maximum force.
Against this background, and viewed through the lens provided by Otwin Marenin's (1982) notion of the relative autonomy of the police, the shootings at Marikana can usefully be understood as acts of specific domination. At the macro level, it is something of a commonplace of both police history (not least in South Africa) and comparative studies of policing to observe that the police are more likely to police for specific domination in the interests of a dominant class, 'race' or other social group in unequal, divided societies. This tendency will be particularly pronounced when the interests of that elite are (or are thought to be) threatened by some form of insurrectionary action and when, at the institutional level, mechanisms for the democratic governance of the police are absent or fail to function effectively. Finally, the enforcement of specific domination at the expense of the maintenance of general order will be especially brutal if the police operate in a permissive climate and believe that they have the support, and enjoy the protection, of the ruling elite.
A number of lessons can be learnt from seeing the violence of Marikana in this way. The first is that, as the shortcomings of the TRC illustrate, the nature of structural violence, its association with gross inequalities in power and life chances, its social, ideological and institutional dimensions, and its impact on the lives of those who experience it, must be fully understood before effective action can be taken to tackle it. It follows from this that responsibility for responding to structural violence cannot be delegated to a time-bound and institutionally limited process of national reconciliation.
Righting the wrongs that flow from entrenched social and economic (as well as political) injustice must be the core business of government, and a target for all the policy instruments at its disposal, over the medium to long term. And lastly, where direct violence has been routinely used by a state agency such as the police irreversible steps must be taken to change not just the professional dispositions of police officers but the structural conditions under which they work; to paraphrase a famous anti-apartheid slogan, there can be no consistently just public order policing order in an unjust society. On the contrary, the danger is that policing and criminal justice more generally may only serve to compound the effects of gross social inequality by inflicting direct violence on those who have long felt the pain of structural disadvantage.
